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Abstract
Recent studies have observed systematic interactions between risk,
time, and social preferences that constitute violations of `dimensional
independence' and are not explained by the leading models of decision
making. This note provides a simple approach to modeling such interaction eects while predicting new ones. In particular, we present a model
of rational-behavioral preferences that takes the convex combination of
`behavioral' System 1 preferences and `rational' System 2 preferences.
The model provides a unifying approach to analyzing risk, time, and social preferences, and predicts how these preferences are correlated with
reliance on System 1 or System 2 thinking.
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Introduction

Many decisions in life involve some combination of risk (e.g., whether to invest
in stocks or bonds), time delays (whether to consume now or save for retirement), and resource allocations (whether to split the bill at a restaurant).
This casual observation is reected in the large volume of research spanning
decisions involving risk, time, and resource allocations. To study these aspects
of decision making, the standard approach in both neoclassical and behavioral
economics is to specify a domain (e.g., decisions under risk), and develop a
model or experiment which focuses on that domain.

This approach encom-

passes the standard normative models of decision making (e.g., expected utility theory, discounted utility theory), as well as the leading behavioral models
(e.g., prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), and rank dependent
utility theory (Quiggin, 1982), for decisions under risk, hyperbolic discounting
(Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992), and quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Laibson,
1997) for decisions over time, and models of other-regarding preferences (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness ad Rabin, 2002) for
decisions over allocations).
The `domain-specic' approach to theory construction helps to `seal o '
and clearly dene the boundaries of a model. The domain-specic approach
has also been very successful in expanding our knowledge of behavior within
each domain.

However, recent experimental work has pushed the boundary

further and identied systematic interaction eects across decision domains.
For instance, Keren and Roelofsma (1995) observed that introducing risk into
intertemporal decisions induces more patient behavior. Baucells and Heukamp
(2010) and Abdellaoui et al. (2011) observed that people are more risk tolerant toward delayed lotteries. Baucells and Heukamp (2012) discuss empirically
observed interactions between payo magnitude and risk and time preferences.
In response to these interaction eects involving risk and time, theories have
been recently advanced to model relationships between risk and time preferences (Halevy, 2008; Fudenberg and Levine, 2011; Baucells and Heukamp,
2012; Epper and Fehr-Duda, 2015). Other models have been proposed to unify
risk preferences and preferences over allocations or `social preferences' (Saito,
2013; Lopez-Vargas, 2014). However, there is no unifying framework which simultaneously operates across all three domains. Jullien (2016) provides a survey of work demonstrating interactions between the dimensions of risk, time,
and social preferences and proposes to `see rationality in 3D'. Jullien distinguishes behaviors `within' dimensions from behaviors `across' dimensions, and
notes:
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 `Within' dimensions means that decision problems are of the form, e.g.,
`a consequence for sure vs. a bigger consequence with uncertainty' or `a consequence now vs. a bigger consequence later' , whereas decisions across dimensions include choices such as  `a consequence for sure but later versus another
consequence now but with uncertainty.' 
Jullien argues:

 `The proposed distinction between challenges within and across dimensions
is more than conceptual, it also delimits a historical rupture between two periods that are nontrivial regarding the debates between behavioral and standard
economics. The classical challenges posed by Kahneman, Tversky, Thaler and
others focused on interactions within dimensions, posing problems to standard
models. The more recent challenges from interactions across dimensions are
posing problems to both standard and behavioral economists' models.
Following this line of research, we develop a decision model which predicts
systematic interaction eects across the dimensions of risk, time, and social
preferences. In light of the preceding comments, we reach a surprising conclusion: A simple way to model the observed interaction eects across the three
decision domains is to combine the standard normative and behavioral models.
In particular, we propose a parametric dual system model in which a decision
maker is driven by the preferences of an intuitive, and aective `System 1' and
a logical, reective `System 2'. System 1 is assumed to have prospect theory
risk preferences , and to be delay-averse and inequity-averse, whereas System
2 is assumed to have expected utility risk preferences and to be delay-neutral
and inequity-neutral. We can view the model developed here as representing
`rational-behavioral preferences,' (RBP) since choice alternatives are evaluated
by the convex combination of a rational (System 2) value function and a behavioral (System 1) value function. We will show that the RBP model unies
phenomena that are not accounted for by the standard normative and behavioral models in isolation. In particular, systematic interactions between risk,
time, and social preferences arise in the model from the interactions between
System 1 and System 2 preferences which can explain empirical violations of
the dimensional independence axiom (Keeney and Raia, 1993). In addition,
the model includes a parameter representing the decision maker's thinking
style or `cognitive type' (the degree to which the decision maker relies on System 2 processing), which is also predicted to be correlated with risk, time, and
social preferences, consistent with the experimental evidence.
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1.1 Related Literature
There is an expanding literature on the relationships between risk, time, and
social preferences.

Much of this work is experimental in nature.

Given the

large literature, we focus our discussion here on alternative theoretical approaches. Halevy (2008) and Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015) provide approaches
to unifying risk and time preferences based on the observation that the future
is inherently uncertain which they model with a constant stopping probability. Baucells and Heukamp provide a model which accounts for interactions
between risk and time preferences, but their approach, like that of Halevy
(2008) and Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015) has no implications regarding the relationship between risk preferences, time preferences, and cognitive skills. In
addition, these approaches do not account for any of the eects related to social
preferences. Saito (2013) and Lopez-Vargas (2014) develop models which account for relationships between risk and social preferences, but their approach
does not consider time preferences. Dreber et al. (2014) provide a dual self
model that applies to social preferences and time preferences, but their analysis does not consider risk preferences. In contrast, the model developed here
applies simultaneously across all three decision domains, demonstrating that
the same mechanism that explains interactions between risk and time preferences can also explain interactions between risk and social preferences and
between time and social preferences. Moreover, the RBP model has novel implications regarding the relationship between risk, time, and social preferences
and reliance on System 1 versus System 2 processing which are supported by
recent experimental evidence. However, the RBP model does not account for
all systematic interaction eects across decision domains.

For instance, the

RBP model employs an outcome-based measure of inequity aversion and so
cannot account for the observation that people may also have preferences for
`equal opportunities' (Saito, 2013).

2

Dimensional Independence

We study interactions between risk, time, and social preferences. One might
consider six pairwise interactions across these domains: (i) risk aects time
preference; (ii) time aects risk preference; (iii) risk aects social preferences;
(iv) social context aects risk preferences; (v) time aects social preferences;
(vi) social context aects time preferences. Additional interaction eects arise
when one also considers changes in payo magnitude.

Each of these inter-

action eects provides a test of the same general principle.
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This principle,

called dimensional independence (Keeney & Raia, 1993; Bhatia, 2016) states
0
0
that two attribute dimensions x and y are independent if for all x , y, x , y
0
0
an alternative (x , y ) is chosen over (x , y ) if and only if (x , y ) is chosen over
0
0
(x , y ). This principle reects the intuition that identical attribute values in
a dimension across alternatives will cancel in the evaluation process and not
aect decisions. This principle is so basic that it is a general feature of both
the leading normative and behavioral decision models.
Table I reveals seven violations of dimensional independence.

For each

choice between options A and B, the table makes the common dimension
explicit.

The nding that delay reduces risk aversion holds the time delay

xed for both options in Choice 1 (no delay) and for both options in Choice 2
(3 months). The nding that risk reduces impatience holds the probabilities
xed for both options in Choice 1 (certainty) and for both options in Choice 2
(probabilities of 0.5). The nding that allocations shift risk preference holds
the other person's payo xed at 9 in Choice 1 and at 16 in Choice 2. The
nding that risk reduces inequity aversion holds the probabilities xed for both
options in Choice 1 (certainty) and for both options in Choice 2 (probabilities
of 0.5).

The behavior that allocations shift time preference holds the other

person's payo xed at 9 in Choice 1 and at 12 in Choice 2. The nding that
delay reduces inequity aversion holds the time delay xed for both options
in Choice 1 (no delay) and for both options in Choice 2 (1 year delay). The
nding that payos interact with risk and time preferences (subendurance)
holds the decision maker's payo xed at 100 in Choice 1 and at 5 in Choice 2.
Since one dimension is held xed within each choice, dimensional independence
predicts that the values in this xed dimension can be interchanged without
aecting behavior.

Yet recent experimental evidence has documented such

violations of dimensional independence.
The model developed here of rational-behavioral preferences predicts each
of these systematic violations in the direction observed in experiments. Schneider (2018) proposes the special case of the RBP model for choices involving
risk and time (but not social) preferences and demonstrates that the model
predicts the risk-time interaction eects identied by Keren and Roelofsma
(1995), Baucells et al. (2009), and Baucells and Heukamp (2010) in Table 1.
In Section 3, we show that the extended RBP model predicts the four additional violations of dimensional independence in Table 1. These violations of
dimensional independence predicted by the RBP model imply that both uncertainty and time reduce the propensity for giving in dictator games, and that
distributional concerns can shift both risk and time preferences. Of the seven
systematic violations of dimensional independence in Table I, ve of them cannot be explained when either

θ = 0 or θ = 1, requiring the interaction between
5

System 1 and System 2 within the model presented here. Further, the RBP
model makes strong directional predictions as it does not predict the reverse
preference patterns. Our modeling approach was merely intended to provide
a formal representation of decision making that accounts for both System 1
and System 2 processes.

We observe that a simple and even natural speci-

cation of this model has the by-product of providing a unied approach to
predicting empirical violations of dimensional independence and to modeling
interactions between risk, time, and social preferences, as well as predicting
their correlations with cognitive reection.

3

Rational-Behavioral Preferences

T, of time periods, a nite set, M, of outcomes
M ⊂ R,and a nite set, I, of individuals. Time periods are indexed by
t ∈ {0, 1, ..., m} and individuals are indexed by i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. A consumption
allocation consists of an outcome for each individual i ∈ I,at each time period
t ∈ T. It can be written:
Let there be a nite set,
with

xj := {(xj 10 , xj 20 , ..., xjk 0 ) , 0; ..., ; (xj1m , xj 2m , ..., xjkm ) , m}
6

where
ual

i

xjit

xj to individX denote a -

is the outcome assigned by consumption allocation

in period

t.

The decision maker is denoted

i = 1.

Let

nite set of consumption allocations with consumption allocations indexed by

j ∈ {1, 2, ..., k }. A stochastic consumption allocation is a lottery over consumption allocations. It is a function f : X → [0, 1], with fj the probability it assigns
to consumption allocation xj . Denote the set of stochastic consumption allocations by ∆(X ).
Schneider (2018) proposes a `dual process utility' model of risk and time
preferences in which a decision maker's preferences over stochastic consumption plans (involving only the decision maker) are given by:

V(f ) = (1 − θ)V1 (f ) + θV2 (f )
where

V1 (f )

erences, and

represents System 1 preferences,

V2 (f )

represents System 2 pref-

θ ∈ [0, 1] reects the decision maker's `cognitive type' (the degree

to which the decision maker relies on System 2 (versus System 1) in decision
making. Motivated by the intuition that prospect theory is a natural model of
System 1 thinking (Kahneman, 2011), Schneider (2018) assumes that System
1 has discounted prospect theory preferences (or for analytical convenience,
discounted rank-dependent utility preferences). That is,

V1 (f ) =

XX
t

δ t π(fjt )u(xj 1t )

j

δ, rank-dependent probability weighting funcπ, and utility or value function, u , where π : [0, 1] → [0, 1], is dened such
π(0) = 0 and π(1) = 1, and

for a System 1 discount factor,
tion,
that

π(f (xjt )) = w (f (xjt ) + · · · + f (x1t )) − w (f (xj −1,t ) + · · · + f (x1t )),
j ∈ {1, 2, ..., k }, where consumption allocations are ranked according
to the
P t
discounted utility for System 1 for each sequence such that
t δ1 u1 (xmt ) ≤
P
...≤ t δ1t u1 (x1t ).

for

Schneider assumes discounted expected utility preferences for System 2 in
general. To make the model tractable, however, Schneider (2018) demonstrates
that all of the behaviors studied in that paper can be explained even with a
parameter-free specication for System 2 in which System 2 is both risk-neutral
and delay-neutral.

That is, System 2 maximizes the undiscounted expected

value of a stochastic consumption plan. Indeed, Harrod (1948) has argued that
an idealized rational agent would not discount the future due to impatience.
The specication for System 2 still permits greater discounting of the future
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due to the presence of uncertainty, particularly if the future is more uncertain
than the present. In this paper, we consider a simple generalization of the dual
process utility model to social preferences. Our main new assumption is that
System 1 is inequality-averse, whereas System 2 is inequality-neutral.

This

assumption is motivated by the intuition that System 1 is inuenced by emotional factors such as conncerns about fairness, whereas System 2 resembles
the textbook economic agent whose utility depends only on its own payo. In
particular, we consider a simple extension of the model in Schneider (2018) to
stochastic consumption allocations given by the parametric form in (1):

V(f ) = θE [f ] + (1 − θ)

XX
t

δ t π(fjt )u(xj 1t −

j

where

E [f ]

α≥0

represents the degree of inequity aversion for System 1.

is the undiscounted expected value of

further simplify (1) by letting

u(x ) = x ,

f

αX
|xjit − xj 1t |)
n i

(1)

to the decision maker and
One might

such that both systems have linear

utility for choices involving only the decision maker. In that case, (1) has three
domain-specic parameters (one each for the risk, time, and social preferences
of System 1), plus the parameter

θ

representing the agent's `cognitive type'

that operates across domains.
Note that (1) imposes a duality between Systems 1 and 2: System 1 preferences are non-linear in probabilities and payos, delay-averse, and inequityaverse, whereas System 2 preferences are risk-neutral, delay-neutral and inequity-

1

neutral . We refer to (1) as rational-behavioral preferences (RBP) since the
model evaluates alternatives according to a weighted average of rational System 2 preferences and behavioral System 1 preferences.

4

Risk and Social Preferences

In this section, we apply the RBP model to explain violations of dimensional
independence involving risk and social preferences. To analyze the examples
from Table I that involve distributional concerns more generally, we consider
choices over stochastic consumption allocations of the form {(x , y ),t, p } which
delivers payo
at time

1 None

t

x

to the decision maker and

with probability

y

to another person to be received

p.

of these conditions on System 2 is necessary for our results; We only require that

System 2 is closer to risk-neutrality, more patient, and less inequity-averse than System 1
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4.1 Inequality aects Risk Preference
Bolton and Ockenfels (2010) observed a modal preference for 9 Euros with
certainty over a 50% chance of 16 Euros. However, they also observed a modal
preference for a 50% chance that the decision maker and a passive recipient
each receive 16 Euros (and a 50% chance they each receive nothing) over
the decision maker receiving 9 Euros and the recipient receiving 16 Euros
with certainty. This preference pattern can hold under (6), due to System 1's
inequity aversion even though neither system is risk-seeking toward gains of
moderate or high probabilities. Similar behavior in which the social context
shifts risk preferences toward less inequity has been observed by Leder and
Betsch (2016).

Denition 1 (Eect of inequality on risk preferences).

exhibits a preference for inequality-reducing lotteries if for all

A person

x > y > 0,

((x , y), t, p) ∼ ((y, y), t, 1) ⇒ ((x , x ), t, p)  ((y, x ), t, 1)

(2)

((x , x ), t, p) ∼ ((y, x ), t, 1) ⇒ ((y, y), t, 1)  ((x , y), t, p)

(3)

Proposition 1: Under the RBP model, a preference for inequality-reducing
lotteries holds for all

θ ∈[0, 1).

4.2 Risk aects Social Preference
A novel implication of RBP is that risk will interact with social preferences.
Under RBP, a decision maker indierent between splitting $10 evenly with a
recipient or keeping all $10 will prefer a 50-50 chance of allocation ($10, $0)
or ($0, $0) over a 50-50 chance of ($5, $5) or ($0, $0). That is, introducing
risk into a dictator game is predicted to reduce inequity aversion. While we
have not seen this precise example, `probabilistic' dictator games have been
conducted by Krawczyk and Le Lec (2010) and Brock et al.

(2013).

Both

studies nd that introducing risk into a dictator game decreases giving by the
dictator. Exley (2016) also found less charitable giving under risk. Denition
8 provides a simple formalization of reduced dictator giving under risk.

Denition 2 (Eect of risk on social preferences).

inequality aversion if for all

Risk reduces

x > y > 0,

((x , 0), t, 1) ∼ ((x − y, y), t, 1) ⇒ ((x, 0), t, 0.5)  ((x − y, y), t, 0.5).

Proposition 2:

Under the RBP model with

inequality aversion if and only if

θ ∈ (0, 1).
9

w (0.5) < 0.5,

(4)

risk reduces

5

Time and Social Preferences

The RBP model further predicts that the social context will aect time preference. We demonstrate these predictions in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.

5.1 Inequality aects Time Preference
An illustrative example from Table III is that a decision maker indierent
between he and another person receiving $9 today or him receiving $12 and
the other person receiving $9 in three months is predicted to strictly prefer an
allocation in which he and another person each receive $12 in three months over
an allocation in which he receives $9 today and the other person receives $12
today. That is, changes in allocations shift preferences toward consumption
sequences with lower inequality.

Denition 3 (Eect of inequality on time preferences).

A per-

son exhibits a preference for inequality-reducing consumption plans if for all

x > y > 0,
((x , y), t, p) ∼ ((y, y), 0, p) ⇒ ((x , x ), t, p)  ((y, x ), 0, p)

(5)

((x , x ), t, p) ∼ ((y, x ), 0, p) ⇒ ((y, y), 0, p)  ((x , y), t, p)

(6)

Proposition 3:

Under the RBP model, a preference for inequality-reducing

consumption plans holds for all

θ ∈[0, 1).

5.2 Time aects Social Preference
The RBP model also predicts that time will interact with social preferences.
For instance, under RBP, a person indierent between splitting $10 evenly
today with a recipient or keeping all $10 for himself will strictly prefer to keep
all $10 when the money is to be received after one year. That is, introducing
delays into a dictator game reduces inequity aversion.

In an experimental

study on a `temporal' dictator game, Kovarik et al. (2009) found that longer
delays decrease giving by the dictator.

This nding was also observed by

Dreber et al. (2014).

Denition 4 (Eect of delay on social preferences).

inequality aversion if for all

r >t >0

and

Delay reduces

x > y > 0,

((x , 0), t, p) ∼ ((x − y, y), t, p) ⇒ ((x, 0), r, p)  ((x − y, y), r, p).
10

(7)

Proposition 4:
if and only if

Under the RBP model, delay reduces inequality aversion

θ ∈ (0, 1).

The condition that

w (0.5) < 0.5

is a robust empirical nding in studies

of prospect theory (Prelec (1998), Gonzalez and Wu (1999), Wakker (2010))
which holds for typical estimates of the standard inverse-S-shaped probability
weighting functions as well as for globally pessimistic weighting functions that
are commonly used in theoretical analyses of rank-dependent utility theory.
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Cognitive Type and Social Preferences

Recent work has documented systematic relationships between risk preferences, time preferences, and cognitive reection (or other measures of analytical thinking) (e.g., Frederick (2005), Burks et al.

(2009), Dohmen et al.

(2010, 2018)). In particular, the emerging perspective is that more reective
thinkers (those who rely more on System 2) are both more patient and closer
to risk-neutrality than more intuitive thinkers (those who rely more on System
1). Schneider (2018) demonstrates that the special case of the RBP model for
choices involving only risk and time preferences predicts these empirically observed correlations. This follows directly from (1) since System 2 has a higher
discount factor than System 1 and System 2 is risk-neutral.
The RBP model in (1) makes additional predictions regarding the relationship between the social preferences of agents with dierent levels of System 2
processing as paramtetrizd by

θ. Consider two agents of type θ1

and

θ2 , where

θ1 < θ2 , with preferences given by (1) and with the same System 1 preferences
that have α1 = α2 > 0. Let %1 and %2 denote the preferences of these agents.
Since agents with higher values of θ are less inequity-averse, the RBP model
generates novel predictions for both the dictator game and the ultimatuum
game.

In the dictator game, one participant (the dictator) decides how to

allocate a xed amount of money between himself and a passive recipient. In
the dictator game, RBP predicts that agents with high cognitive types (higher

θ)

give less than agents with lower values of

θ.

Formally:

Proposition 5 (Cognitive Type and the Dictator Game):

Under

the RBP model, for the dictator in the dictator game, the propensity to give
money decreases with

θ. For any x > y > 0, if (x , 0) ∼1 (x−y, y), then (x , 0) 2

(x − y, y).
Empirical support for Proposition 5 comes from an experimental study by
Ponti and Rodriguez-Lara (2015) who administered the cognitive reection
test (CRT) due to Frederick (2005) to players that also participated in a dictator game.

The CRT is a three-item measure where each question has an
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intuitive but incorrect answer, and a correct answer which requires a moment
of reection. The test is designed to identify decision makers who rely more on
System 1 versus System 2 processing, with higher scores relying more on reective thinking (System 2). Consistent with Proposition 5, subjects with higher
scores on the CRT gave less in the dictator game. Ponti and Rodriguz-Lara
comment "Impulsive Dictators show a marked inequity aversion attitude," and
that "Reective Dictators show lower distributional concerns, except for the
situations in which the Dictators' payo is held constant. Cueva et al. (2016)
and Capraro et al. (2017) also found low CRT subjects to be more inequityaverse than high CRT subjects in dictator game experiments.

Schulz et al.

(2014) likewise found that subjects under high cognitive load (a means to
increase reliance on System 1) also gave more in a dictator game experiment.
The ultimatum game, a close relative of the dictator game, involves two
players who make sequential decisions. The rst mover decides how much of
a xed sum to oer the other player. If the other player accepts, the proposed
oer is implemented. If the other player rejects the oer, both players receive
nothing. The RBP model makes the following prediction for the ultimatum
game:

Proposition 6 (Cognitive Type and the Ultimatum Game):

Under

the RBP model, for the responder in the ultimatum game, the acceptance of
unfair oers increases with

θ.

For any

x > y > 0,

if

(y, x − y) ∼1 (0, 0),

then

(y, x − y) 2 (0, 0).
That is, RBP predicts people who rely more on System 2 to be more
likely to accept unfair oers (i.e., oers with a larger amount for the proposer)
in the ultimatum game than those who rely more on System 1.

Empirical

support for Proposition 6 comes from experiments by Neys et al. (2011) and
Calvillo and Burgeno (2015) who each found that higher scoring participants
on the cognitive reection test were more likely to accept unfair ultimatum
game oers. The RBP model in (1) thus oers novel and empirically supported
predictions of how distributional preferences relate to risk and time preferences,
and to the agent's cognitive type.

7

Conclusion

In a review of research across the dimensions of risk, time, and social preferences, Jullien (2016) remarks, the topic of interactions across dimensions has
been understudied in economic theory. Here we presented a model of decision
making that predicts relationships between risk, time, and social preferences
that have empirical support. In particular, the RBP model predicts system-

12

atic violations of dimensional independence in the direction observed in experiments. The RBP model also predicts that decision makers who rely more
on System 2 processing will give less money in a dictator game and will be
more likely to accept unfair oers in the ultimatum game as observed in recent
studies based on the cognitive reection test. More broadly, RBP enlarges the
canvas by accounting for the probabilistic, intertemporal, and social context
as part of the description of the decision problem. Doing so enables RBP to
explain a variety of context eects while retaining a transitive preference function. As the volume of research in these areas is fast expanding and it may be
too early to identify `canonical' eects, we view RBP as more of a theoretical
framework for generating novel predictions and guiding new experiments than
as a denitive theory. Theoretical approaches to integrating risk, time, and
social preferences must start somewhere, and we have developed RBP as a
simple unifying approach to portray rationality in 3D.

Appendix (Proofs of Propositions)

Proposition 1:

Under the RBP model, a preference for inequality-reducing

lotteries holds for all

Proof:

θ ∈[0, 1).

To establish (2), we need to show that (8) implies (9)

(1 − θ)δ t u(y) + θy = (1 − θ)w (p)δ t u(x − α(x − y)) + θpx .

(8)

(1 − θ)δ t u(y − α(x − y)) + θy < (1 − θ)w (p)δ t u(x ) + θpx .

(9)

u(y − α(x − y)) < u(y) and u(x − α(x − y)) < u(x )given System 1
is inequity-averse (α > 0), and thus (8) implies (9). An analogous argument
establishes condition (3). 

Note that

Proposition 2:

Under the RBP model with

equality aversion if and only if

Proof:

w (0.5) < 0.5,

risk reduces in-

θ ∈ (0, 1).

To prove suciency, we need to show that (10) implies (11):

θy = (1 − θ)δ t [u(x − y − α|x − 2y|)) − u(x − αx )].

(10)

0.5θy > (1 − θ)w (0.5)δ t [u(x − y − α|x − 2y|)) − u(x − αx )].

(11)

θy > 0, equation (10) implies u(x − αx ) < u(x − y − α|x − 2y|)).
Since w (0.5) < 0.5, after substituting (10) into (11), it follows that (11) holds
and θ ∈ (0, 1) is sucient.
Since
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Necessity that

θ ∈ (0, 1)

follows since the probability weights cancel when

evaluating the two alternatives in the special cases of
risk does not aect social preferences in those cases.

Proposition 3:

θ = 1,

and



θ ∈[0, 1).

To establish (5), we need to show that (12) implies (13)

(1 − θ)w (p)u(y) + θpy = (1 − θ)w (p)δ t u(x − α(x − y)) + θpx .

(12)

(1 − θ)w (p)u(y − α(x − y)) + θpy < (1 − θ)w (p)δ t u(x ) + θpx .

(13)

Note that
thus (12)

u(y − α(x − y)) < u(y) and u(x − α(x − y)) < u(x )givenα > 0, and
implies (13). An analogous argument establishes condition (6). 

Proposition 4:
and only if

Proof:

Under the RBP model, delay reduces inequality aversion if

θ ∈ (0, 1).

To prove suciency, we need to show that (14) implies (15):

θpy = (1 − θ)w (p)δ t [u(x − y − α|2y − x |)) − u(x − αx )].

(14)

θpy > (1 − θ)w (p)δ r [u(x − y − α|2y − x |)) − u(x − αx )].

(15)

equation (14) implies u(x
r
t
Note that (15) holds since δ < δ for all
Since

and

Under the RBP model, a preference for inequality-reducing

consumption plans holds for all

Proof:

θ=0

θpy > 0,

− αx ) < u(x − y − α|2y − x |)).
δ ∈ (0, 1), and thus θ ∈ (0, 1) is

suf-

cient.
Necessity that

θ ∈ (0, 1)

follows since the discount factors of System 1 and

System 2 cancel when evaluating the two alternatives in the special cases of

θ = 0 and θ = 1, and delay does not aect social preferences in those cases. 
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